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This article reviews the experience with reforms in Fiji and 
makes observations about the capacity of other Pacific states 
to develop and implement a regional reform agenda. Are 
extensive reform agendas in the Pacific prone to failure without 
better understanding of the capabilities of state institutions? In 
particular, there is little assessment of alternative approaches 
to policy implementation such as the capacity of local and 
indigenous institutions to guide the policy development and 
implementation process more effectively.1  
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in the South Pacific
scott hook
In the South Pacific, the introduced 
institutions of the modern nation-
state have always been overlaid on…a 
multiplicity of indigenous political 
structures. (Wainwright 2003:27)
Since independence, the economic perform-
ance of the Pacific island economies has 
lagged behind that of similar states in other 
parts of the world. These outcomes have 
occurred during periods of both high and 
low economic growth worldwide. They 
have occurred in spite of many of these 
nations following a range of economic 
policies that has succeeded in other low 
and middle-income nations. During this 
period, we have witnessed the rise and 
fall of ideas such as the development state, 
structural adjustment policies, the Wash-
ington Consensus and the post-Washington 
Consensus. Unfortunately, the outcome is a 
region that remains substantially dependent 
on relatively large transfers of foreign aid 
and remittances or where foreign countries 
actively manage their economies.
Since the early 1990s, the World Bank 
and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
have analysed the region’s economies 
in various publications in attempting to 
explain the reasons for this weak growth. 
Despite these and other efforts to over-
come the problem, the Pacific has been 
characterised as having poor prospects for 
change and has been given a label for its 
own malaise— ‘the Pacific paradox’. There 
has not been an absence of ideas for reform 
in the region but there is a lack of sustain-
ability in implementation. Part of this 
problem is the lack of internal demand for 
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reform, as there has been a long-established 
compact between governments, local busi-
ness and urban workers to retain the status 
quo. Furthermore, the lack of competition 
has reduced the need for these nations to 
cultivate their most important economic 
resource—their human capital.
Frustrated by weak national reform, 
the Pacific Plan represents another possible 
way of locking in regional commitments 
to implement and pursue reforms. It seeks 
to introduce a suite of options for regional 
approaches to national-level challenges. The 
options selected by Pacific Islands Forum 
countries will depend on the type and level 
of regional cooperation required. The crea-
tion of regionally based organisations is an 
option, but it is not the only available option. 
In a global economy in which competition 
for investment is intense, there is, however, 
a strong incentive to move to such regional 
arrangements.
The Pacific has been a laboratory for 
different economic ideas and this is the case 
with the Pacific Plan. This article explores 
the likelihood of success of these reforms. It 
begins with a review of economic growth in 
Pacific economies and notes that the region 
has been underperforming for a long time. It 
goes on to discuss the effect this will have on 
future living standards in the region. Next, it 
highlights the current path to development 
and puts it into an institutional context. 
Finally, the article examines the experience 
with reform in the Fijian civil service in an 
attempt to understand the reasons for its 
failure. Fiji is an appropriate country to 
draw on as an example: it is large enough 
to have a diversified economy, it has a large 
public sector and it has undergone periods 
of reform. After reviewing the weak record 
on national reform, this analysis concludes 
that the lack of capacity of local institutions 
makes change unlikely in order to adapt to 
this new regional platform for reform.
Reviewing economic growth
The economic performance of the Pacific 
island nations has been variable during 
the three decades of their independence. 
National growth and regional growth are 
compared with two other regions (the Car-
ibbean and sub-Saharan Africa) to provide 
contrasts with other small island states and 
developing nations (Table 1). There has 
been an expectation that the Pacific would 
exhibit higher levels of economic growth 
and living standards, considering the scale 
of development assistance, the moderate 
levels of labour skills in most of the larger 
nations and the availability of capital. The 
lack of robust, sustained growth and the 
rapidly increasing populations have had 
adverse implications for living standards. 
There are rising levels of poverty in most 
of Melanesia and Nauru. Outcomes as 
measured by the United Nations’ Human 
Development Index are disappointing 
(UNDP 2005). For example, in 2003, Fiji was 
ranked ninety-second in the world (keeping 
company with Sri Lanka and Turkey despite 
having a far higher gross domestic product 
per capita than Sri Lanka). The poor rates 
of growth reflect historical choices that 
have been made since independence but 
also some binding constraints (Sugden 
2008) that have shaped the development 
process. In addition, particular factors such 
as military coups have slowed or impeded 
Fiji’s economic progress. Overall, productiv-
ity growth has been weak and employment 
growth in most of the region has been unable 
to keep up with labour force growth and is 
often concentrated in the public sector. The 
Pacific region appears to have missed out 
on the strong world economy in the years 
2002–07 and economic growth fluctuates 
significantly (Table 1).
The problem for developing nations is 
that weak growth can have implications 
that stretch over generations. The risk to the 
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economy greatly increases if the population 
is growing rapidly and there is migration 
from rural areas to urban areas. The emer-
gence of squatter settlements in Suva, Port 
Moresby and Honiara is testament to the fact 
that for large parts of the population living 
standards are worse than at independence 
and opportunities for future generations are 
likely to continue to worsen. Weak growth 
also affects a society’s approach to wealth 
generation. Bowman (2005) suggests that 
weak growth might have encouraged the 
pursuit of ‘rent seeking’ and the spread of 
corrupt relationships between governments, 
bureaucrats and local businesses as they 
move from wealth creation to redistribution 
among family and ethnic groups.
One feature of the development experi-
ence of the Pacific is that government has 
played an important role in investment, 
running businesses and employing labour. 
Some observers have suggested that it 
appears that after more than two decades 
of weak growth, Pacific economies need less 
government regulation and should provide 
more opportunity to allow their version of 
a market economy to develop (for example, 
Duncan, Cuthbertson and Bosworth 1999). 
This, however, requires an institutional 
environment that is conducive to business, 
with government providing effective rule 
of law, a clear process of accountability 
for government departments and a low 
regulatory burden. There are some good 
Table 1  Real economic growth in the Pacific, 2002–07 (percentage change per annum)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Cook Islands 2.6 8.2 4.3 0.1 0.8 2.5
Fiji 3.2 1.0 5.3 0.7 3.4 –4.0
Federated States of 
Micronesia
1.4 3.3 –4.3 1.5 –0.7 1.0
Kiribati 2.7 –1.5 2.3 2.5 1.1 1.0
Nauru 0.1 –6.3 1.2 1.4 .. ..
Palau –3.5 –1.3 4.9 5.5 5.7 5.5
Papua New Guinea –0.2 2.2 2.9 3.4 2.6 6.2
Marshall Islands 3.8 3.4 5.6 1.7 1.3 2.5
Samoa 1.0 3.1 3.4 5.2 2.6 3.1
Solomon Islands –1.6 6.4 8.0 5.0 6.1 6.3
Tonga 3.0 3.2 1.4 2.3 0.7 –3.5
Tuvalu 5.5 4.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 2.5
Vanuatu –7.4 3.2 5.5 6.5 7.2 6.6
The Pacific 0.4 1.8 3.6 2.6 2.6 3.2
The Caribbean 3.6 3.2 2.6 6.7 8.8 5.5
Sub-Saharan Africa 3.6 4.2 5.3 5.8 5.7 6.1
.. not available 
Source: Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), 2008. Pacific Economic Survey 2008, 
AusAID, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra.
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island nation examples, such as Mauritius, 
and even locally, such as Samoa. The cur-
rent development debate suggests that the 
choice is between whether this is done best 
by adopting successful structures from 
overseas and adapting them to local needs 
or by becoming part of a wider economic 
community to impose discipline externally. 
The latter might occur either economically 
by trade or politically by agreement to lower 
the costs of developing and maintaining 
supportive institutions. The current local 
structures appear to be insufficient, as 
Duncan and Gilling (2005) estimate that 
weak governance costs the region more 
than 2 per cent of its gross domestic product 
(GDP).
It has to be acknowledged that there are 
also physical and environmental limits to 
reform and integration and that the Pacific 
islands suffer from a range of disadvantages 
that creates additional developmental chal-
lenges: high transport costs, dependence 
on a narrow range of exports whose prices 
fluctuate substantially, isolation from major 
world markets, vulnerability to domestic 
conflict and natural disasters, and great cul-
tural and linguistic diversity. These factors 
in combination weaken the State’s authority 
to reach beyond the city limits. When they 
are combined with historical institutions 
that are inappropriate, over-extended public 
sectors and poor policy decision–making, 
some of the reasons why sustainable growth 
has been a problem become apparent 
(Figure 1). As the scope increases there is 
a need for additional capacity by the state 
but it becomes constrained by an absence 
of resources and skilled staff. As a result, 
the state becomes increasingly ineffective 
when attempting more complicated func-
tions.  With constrained resources and 
capabilities it is best to focus on the key 
tasks, such as law and order and providing 
basic services.
The role of institutions in growth
By reviewing and understanding the 
institutional structure of Pacific states, we 
can assess the lack of success of reform and 
low growth in the Pacific. The importance 
of ensuring the right sanctions, incentives 
and governance in the development process 
has considerable empirical support (Rodrik 
2000, Easterly 2001). Emerging as a key part 
of the post-Washington Consensus, better 
governance enables the representation of the 
welfare, rights and interests of constituents, 
the creation and enforcement of policies and 
laws, the administration and delivery of 
programs and services, the management of 
natural, social and cultural resources, and 
negotiations between governments and 
other groups. For a nation that faces inef-
ficiency generated by corruption and rent 
seeking, better governance is an important 
aspect of reform and increasingly is a key 
step in the reform process.
At the national level, there has been 
some delay in understanding its impor-
tance, but institutional reform has been 
at the centre of the Pacific Islands Forum 
Secretariat’s agenda from the outset. Before 
the first Forum Economic Ministers’ Meet-
ing (FEMM) in 1997, the forum broadly 
concentrated on economic reform programs. 
Since then, there has been a refocusing 
on appropriate institutional frameworks 
as a prerequisite to successful economic 
reform—in particular, land rights and prop-
erty rights. This shift in focus is reflected 
in the selection of issues/topics for discus-
sions in subsequent FEMMs.2 Policy issues 
canvassed have included accountability, 
land rights and economic regulation. A 2004 
report to the FEMM found that all forum 
island countries accepted that appropriate 
institutional reform was a prerequisite to 
successful reform. Institutional reform in 
the forum island countries is, however, at 
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different stages; and implementation is 
very difficult, due partly to objections from 
traditional leaders as well as politicians.
In this article, institutions are defined in 
the broadest possible sense. They are consid-
ered to be a set of behavioural rules commonly 
observed by individuals in society. North 
(1990) defined institutions as formal and 
informal rules that determined the conduct 
of people in various areas of the economy. 
Feeny (1988) argues that they perform several 
important functions that include
channelling information about market •	
conditions, goods and participants
defining and enforcing property rights •	
and contracts; determining who gets 
what, how and when
increasing or decreasing competition in •	
markets through regulations, laws and 
codes.
There appears to be a move by many 
countries to a set of institutions that sup-
ports a business environment. Beeson (2003) 
argues that states are essentially rational 
and cooperate to reduce transaction costs. 
History, culture and geography, however, 
build up inertia to change and often create 
a set of guideposts that directs nations along 
a certain path of development. As rules 
for business and government take time to 
develop, it can be hard to change the under-
lying institutional settings as there are often 
large direct costs. While particular types 
of institutions might make a society less 
Figure 1    Linking institutions and capacity
Activist 
functions 
Intermediate functions market
regulation and education 
S
co
pe
 E
ffectiveness
Minimalist function - law and order
Source: Adjusted by the author from Fukuyama, F., 2004. State Building: governance and world order in the 21st 
century, Cornell University Press, New York.
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productive, cultural, historical and social 
factors act to reinforce each other, making 
change costly. Aron (2000) shows that there 
are considerable sunk costs in developing 
political and economic organisations that 
operate in a particular institutional environ-
ment. As a result, nations seek to use trade 
and regional integration arrangements to 
change local institutions.
There have been some notable examples 
of weak institutional structures in the Pacific 
region. For example, one of the key reasons 
for the poor development of agriculture (and 
its supporting commercial and industrial 
structure) in the Pacific has been the lack of 
commercial access to communal land aris-
ing from a poorly developed institutional 
structure for the purchase, sale, transfer 
and lease of land (Forum Secretariat 2001). 
It is, however, important to acknowledge 
that there are deep cultural links between 
land and Pacific peoples that affect the pace 
of institutional change of key institutions, 
such as the conventions associated with land 
ownership. The rest of this section explores 
the relationship between institutions and 
culture.
Bowles (1998) suggests that markets 
and other economic institutions do more 
than allocate goods and services; they also 
influence the evolution of values, tastes and 
personalities. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 
(2006) define culture as those customary 
beliefs and values that ethnic, religious and 
social groups transmit largely unchanged 
from generation to generation. Culture can 
affect people’s expectations and preferences 
and these have a direct impact on economic 
outcomes. While the causality between 
institutions and culture runs both ways, it is 
generally considered that culture is a given, 
as it is often difficult to change country and 
faith and impossible to change ethnicity, 
race and family history. Landes (1998) 
emphasises the links from culture to beliefs 
and values to economic outcomes to support 
his notion that economically successful 
nations are driven by what he terms positive 
cultural factors. In particular, he contrasts 
the cultural factors that are associated with 
enterprise and innovation—thrift, hard 
work, tenacity, honesty and tolerance—with 
those that stifle it— xenophobia, religious 
intolerance, bureaucratic corruption and 
state edicts.
There are few measures of institutions 
in the Pacific or assessment of their linkages 
to cultural values. Concerns of non-govern-
mental organisations such as Transparency 
International about corruption and lack 
of transparency and accountability in the 
region indicate, however, that cultural 
values might not be consistent with modern 
notions of governance. In the Pacific, there 
are many aspects that have shaped local 
cultural attitudes. Some of the local dif-
ficulties with neo-liberal thought might 
be traced to aspects of traditional Pacific 
economic systems. Schischka (2006) notes 
that the production of root crops has created 
a different kind of economic system to that 
in cultures dependent on rice or wheat. 
The local cultivation of root crops has led 
to villages being relatively self-sufficient in 
food—but these commodities often cannot 
be stored and this has reduced the opportu-
nity to produce and build up surpluses or to 
undertake trade throughout the community 
or region.
These cultural traditions have had to 
work within a political and economic struc-
ture that was gifted at independence from 
colonial nations. Nearly all the nations in the 
region have European systems of govern-
ment, laws, courts and constitutions inspired 
by liberal concepts of political and economic 
development. Since independence, there has 
been some attempt to shape the laws and the 
economy to local needs. After 20 to 30 years 
of independence, however, the outcome has 
been weak growth and a perception of weak 
or incompetent states. Increasingly, in this 
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globalised environment, there is pressure for 
change and it is important to understand the 
role of institutions in that process. The inabil-
ity of most Pacific states to meet the demands 
of modern forms of government might reflect 
a lack of local capacity to operate the structure 
and processes of the State that industrialised 
nations take as given.
A new path to development?
Under pressure from major donors dissatis-
fied with more than 30 years of variable 
performance and the ever-emerging pres-
sure of movable populations and capital 
through globalisation, it appears that the 
Pacific island states are increasingly facing 
the prospect of either continuing to work 
individually and face harsher conditions on 
aid (or receive less aid) or establishing their 
own regional structure to improve their 
negotiating position for trade and aid and 
mutually support each other’s reforms and 
development. The Pacific Plan represents 
a new approach to regional development. 
The plan brings together about nine million 
people, in an area that is spread across the 
Pacific. It builds on the cultural, trade and 
investment agreements that have developed 
within the region. It covers the four pillars of 
economic growth, sustainable development, 
good governance and security. Robertson 
(2005) describes the agreement as involving
regional cooperation—involving politi-•	
cal agreements and increased sporting 
and cultural linkages
regional provision of public services by •	
pooling various national education and 
regulatory agencies, such as the Forum 
Fisheries Agency
regional integration, increasing trade •	
and investment linkages through reduc-
ing barriers to the movement of goods, 
services and people.
The Pacific nations’ move to regionalism 
is a reaction to the emerging issues related 
to global trade and investment liberalisation 
and the consequences of civil strife facing 
several Pacific states. At the economic level, 
there appear to be few strong reasons for the 
reforms since most nations have a primary 
trade relationship with a combination of 
Australia, New Zealand, the United States 
and/or Japan. At the regional level, trade 
reform has been delayed by a succession of 
trade disputes among several Pacific states 
that have attempted to protect their own 
narrow manufacturing base from other 
states. In trade terms, there are few gains 
to be generated from trading with nations 
that have the same type of exports or that 
export goods more expensively than other 
markets. Collier (2007) argues that regional 
trade agreements among poor countries 
are damaging, leading to accelerating 
divergence in living standards from global 
trends and trade diversion.
It is more plausible to see the Pacific 
Plan as a political agreement and some-
thing that is favoured by regional donors 
in response to the variable record of more 
than a decade of individual reform. For 
example, many nations do not lack good 
ideas about how to fix their problems. While 
the range of reviews, reports and analysis is 
extensive, however, few positive outcomes 
have emerged. The forum economic min-
isters have been making statements about 
reform and accountability for more than 10 
years. The Pacific Plan reflects an attempt 
to redress what has been absent in previous 
reform attempts—political will to support 
changes and capacity to implement them.
The role of capacity: reform in Fiji
This section provides an overview of public 
sector reform in Fiji in order to understand 
the difficulties it has faced in sustaining 
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reform. On independence, Fiji inherited 
a public sector from the colonial govern-
ment. The public sector in Fiji is large, thus 
absorbing a hefty proportion of government 
expenditure and important elements of the 
small, skilled workforce. The total budget 
expenditure in 2002 as a percentage of GDP 
was 36 per cent (although it has fallen since), 
but budget deficits remain a common feature. 
In addition, several key business inputs (such 
as water and electricity) are government-
owned corporations or departments. Most 
of the public sector-owned enterprises have 
been making very low or, in several cases, 
negative rates of returns. The fiscal drain 
that this has placed on the economy has been 
increasingly recognised since the 1990s and 
identified by the World Bank, the ADB and 
other donors in numerous reports. The Fijian 
government has made several attempts to 
reform the public service and public enter-
prises in the past 15 years, with differing 
levels of effectiveness and enthusiasm. For 
example, the Chaudhry Government of 2000 
announced it was committed to reform but 
made a series of policy reversals (such as the 
reversal of the reform of the Airports of Fiji 
Limited) that indicated it was unwilling to 
undertake significant public sector reform.
Reddy, Prasad, Sharma, Vosikata and 
Duncan (2004) suggest that this situa-
tion has arisen for various reasons. Fijian 
governments in the 1970s and 1980s used 
government enterprises and departments 
as active partners in development. Using 
the government’s monopoly in a range of 
key business inputs, the aim was to ensure 
that local businesses were able to expand. 
Overall, there was a general suspicion of 
private enterprise and the adverse impact 
that freer trade with industrialised nations 
would have on local industries. World 
events, however, led to a change in policy. 
From the mid 1980s onwards, there was a 
wider move in industrialised nations to ‘roll 
back’ government.
Since the slowdown in world growth 
after the recessions of the 1980s, it has 
been a challenge to successive Fijian gov-
ernments to adopt good macroeconomic 
policies while maintaining a large amount 
of microeconomic control over the economy. 
In addition, as economic problems began 
to emerge, there was increasing realisation 
that good policies meant little if there was 
no effective public sector to implement 
and enforce them. The capacity of the 
public service steadily worsened after the 
1987 coup, when there was a move away 
from promoting people in the public sector 
on merit and an absence of principles of 
transparency and good management in 
government payments to support indig-
enous groups and businesses. Despite the 
lack of interest in reform in the early 1990s, 
mounting deficits and the collapse of the 
National Bank of Fiji led to reforms being 
implemented. The reform process, however, 
was confused, as there was inadequate 
preparation of legislation for the different 
stages of public sector reform such as the 
development of a financial and governance 
framework. This was compounded by the 
lack of staff experienced in public sector 
reform to draft the required legislation and 
regulations for successful implementation.
Overall, the reform experience in Fiji has 
been variable. Some of the problems relate 
to a lack of capacity as existing government 
structures have impeded political and 
economic development and nation build-
ing. Considering the problems that have 
occurred with reform in the public sector, 
there is some question about the extent to 
which top-down reform has been appro-
priate for Fiji. The delay in reform can be 
traced to inadequate capacity to undertake 
the required reforms in the early period, 
which later moved to resistance from vested 
interests within government and also from 
interests outside government that enjoyed 
the rents arising from the system. This 
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resistance has been exacerbated by the 
absence of clear government leadership 
and determination to follow through with 
reforms. It appears that Fiji does not have 
the capacity to face different types of chal-
lenges, to persevere in a certain direction of 
change against setbacks and opposition or 
to detect flaws in a given institutional archi-
tecture and fix them. The lesson from this 
example is that without an understanding 
of local capacity constraints, regional-level 
reform might lead to similar mistakes being 
made. As Fukuda-Parr, Lopes and Malik 
(2002) suggest, capacity building needs to 
be addressed at the individual, institutional 
and society levels.
What stops better policy being 
adopted? The role of capacity in 
reform
[U]ntil we realize that we are choosing 
between social arrangements that are 
more or less all failures, we are not 
likely to make much headway (Coase 
1964:195).
Ruis and van de Walle (2003) consider 
state capacity to refer to the ability of state 
agencies to conceive, design, undertake and 
evaluate economic policies. The growth 
of institutional thought has provided an 
opportunity for a reconsideration of the role 
that social norms play in the development of 
community relationships and their linkage 
to development. Aoki (2001) highlights the 
role of community norms as an institutional 
device to promote and sustain cooperation 
in the community to facilitate and/or 
deter the transition to a market economy. 
Thus, without a clear understanding of the 
role and importance of local institutions 
and local state capacity there is a strong 
possibility that reforms at the national or 
international level will continue to falter, 
highlighting, in essence, the importance of 
institutional reform.
Underdeveloped state capacity, coupled 
with poorly utilised institutions and a small 
base of human capital, means that a state 
cannot create a firm foundation for the com-
plex and wide-ranging reforms required to 
be a part of the global economy. While build-
ing capacity has been a central plank of the 
aid effort by many nations, it has to be more 
than just training and education focused on 
the public sector. Fukuyama (2004) suggests 
that private sectors must be strengthened to 
enable them to lead the demand for change. 
In the case of Fiji, we find that government 
effectiveness, as measured by the University 
of the South Pacific, has changed little in the 
past 10 years (Gani and Duncan 2007).
Weak institutional and economic struc-
tures have led Pacific island states—like 
other fragile states—to be dependent on 
small political and business elites that have 
effectively captured the levers of state power 
and use these positions to enrich themselves 
and reward their support bases, who are 
usually members of their own community 
or language group. This has created an envi-
ronment in which corruption has developed. 
An inability to deal with corruption has been 
the real failure in the region. Opportunity 
has been provided by arbitrary action by 
government to support particular groups 
via special tariffs, exemptions, incentives 
and preferences for government contracts. 
Application of standards in an ad hoc 
fashion encourages corruption that severely 
damages growth prospects and labour force 
development. Combined with poor fiscal 
expenditure guidelines, weak manage-
ment and inadequate skills, an atmosphere 
develops in which connections to particular 
people become important and payments 
made to certain individuals reduce the 
administrative burden but distort economic 
activity and create incentives for further 
corruption (World Bank 2001).
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Can Pacific-wide reform make a 
difference?
[T]he spread of economic globalization 
brings great potential benefits—
but only if countries can develop 
strong and resilient institutions, and 
maintain present economic policies 
(Downer 2004).
The Pacific Plan has been hailed as an impor-
tant means to support forum island countries 
in overcoming their structural challenges 
through various regional arrangements and, 
in some cases, capacity supplementation. 
The task, however, is large. In particular, 
adapting some of the work by Collier (2007), 
we can identify several key state-capacity 
issues. For example, the existence of local 
conflict within nations remains in Solomon 
Islands, Papua New Guinea and Fiji. Trans-
port and communication linkages remain 
weak or in the hands of local monopolies, 
and several countries have mismanaged 
their natural resources.
These factors bring into focus the absence 
of the will to reform in these countries. It has 
not been a matter of starting reform but more 
that it rarely is seen through and completed. 
In addition, it is easier for foreign govern-
ments and multinational agencies to wait 
for the local conditions to deteriorate and 
then begin new programs than to change 
and adapt to the local conditions. In many 
countries, there is a strong culture of rent 
seeking that aims to delay reform. There 
is a long history of patronage, rent seeking 
and pork-barrelling to obtain and maintain 
political support. As a result, the longer the 
absence of will, the faster the capacity to 
implement and support reform in the public 
sector will decline. Overall, as Ruis and van 
de Walle (2003) observe of the reform experi-
ence in other low-income states, reform is 
likely to be undermined by problems of 
local ownership and poor implementation. 
Similarly, any benefit from reform has to be 
defended from sectional interests that will 
seek to control any additional income and 
investment opportunities.
The experience in Fiji has shown that 
reform either by decree or ministerial 
statement does not occur if there is no 
bureaucratic capacity to follow through 
with the implementation of the proposed 
changes. Even the supposed advantage of 
authoritarian leaders fails in the face of inca-
pacity. The reformist optimism of the Pacific 
Plan therefore requires a serious review and 
understanding of the local public service 
and its levels of skill and capacity. In Fiji, 
the failure of the first phase of public sector 
reform was due partly to an absence of 
skilled staff to understand the legislative 
requirements and changes in budgetary and 
financial regulations required by govern-
ment. In addition, there was an absence 
of accounting and managerial expertise 
needed by boards for successful corporatisa-
tion and privatisation.
Other key lessons and messages drawn 
from the FEMM report (Pacific Islands 
Forum Secretariat 2004), which reaffirm 
the importance of institutional change for 
economic reforms, include
the importance of strengthening civil •	
society to ensure transparency and 
accountability
the key role played by institutional •	
structures with respect to rights to 
land
the fact that all such change is not •	
without transaction costs, which might 
be reduced by gradual adjustment and 
by approaching reform on a case-by-
case basis
the fact that institutions go far beyond •	
the direct economic ones—economic 
change requires broad institutional 
change and the implications need to be 
transparent; thus institutional reform 
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must be transparent and accountable 
and easily understood by the people
accepting that there is potential for •	
major conflicts of interest between 
stakeholders over the creation of new 
institutions that disrupt the status 
quo, such as traditional leaders (in Fiji, 
Samoa and Tonga) and landowners (in 
Fiji, Solomon Islands and Papua New 
Guinea), and developing strategies to 
address these potential conflicts
broadly, with respect to issues of land-•	
holding, the challenge for Pacific island 
governments is in structuring the 
land-access system so as to balance the 
needs of the modern economy with the 
traditional demands of society.
Conclusion
The importance of state capacity to reform 
program outcomes has long been underes-
timated by the designers of policy reform 
programs. North (1993) suggests that 
successful economic growth is the story 
of the evolution of more complex institu-
tions, composed of rules—the norms of 
behaviour—and the way they are enforced. 
These institutions create the forms of coop-
erative relations necessary for businesses 
and individuals to trade and participate 
in economic activity with confidence. 
Thus, without an understanding of the 
development of institutions and their role 
in better outcomes, there will be inadequate 
outcomes and an absence of support for the 
reform process.
Without change to existing institutions 
there is little likelihood that the Pacific 
islands will be able to overcome historical 
practices and, in particular, challenges such 
as limited market access arrangements, 
political instability, deteriorating security 
situations, poor macroeconomic manage-
ment, poor governance, poor infrastructure, 
limited access to land and slow and/or 
intermittent public sector reforms. If there is 
no new paradigm for national institutions, 
academics and bureaucrats will be examin-
ing the status of the Pacific in another 10 
years and wondering what new approach 
to reform should be taken.
Notes
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented 
at the PIPSA conference, December 2007, Port 
Vila, Vanuatu.
2 A list of issues/topics considered at the annual 
FEMM can be accessed via the following link: 
http://www.forumsec.org/pages.cfm/
economic-growth/economic-growth-work-
programme-1/forum-economic-ministers-
meeting-femm-1/.
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